Book Review: [i]Hitler's U-Boat War[/i] by Clay Blair (Two volumes)

[Don in Cincinnati]

Hitler's U-Boat War

Author: Clay Blair
Volume One: The Hunters 1939-1942
volume Two: the Hunted 1942-1945
Publisher: Random House


Clay Blair served in combat in the Pacific and knows a lot about submarines. At 700 pages for volume one, and 719 pages for volume two - and not including almost 200 pages of appendix material- his magnum opus is crammed with facts, maps, interviews and statistics enough to completely satisfy anyone interested in World War Two U-boat warfare. The research alone took over a decade.

Blair is a writer with a point of view and more than one axe to grind. He contends, for example, that despite the horrific allied shipping losses during the "happy times,"  the U-boat peril was vastly overblown, and Germany failed to sink more boats than the allies could build. He cites a plethora of facts to support his contention.

He also takes on historian Michael Gannon who offers a strong criticism of Admiral King's failure to convoy shipping along America's coastline in Operation drumbeat, citing more pages of facts to support King's decision.

Indeed, this is perhaps one of several failings in an otherwise fascinating history of the U-boat war.  A page or two of detailed information would have sufficed to make the point. A dozen pages is overkill, and boring overkill at that.

The second failing is a repetition of phrases scattered throughout the books.  It is enough to know, for example, that U-Boat commanders qualified for their Ritterkreuz upon sinking 100,000 tons of shipping. To be reminded of this fact as each candidate got his award makes for dull reading.

All this aside, when Blair adopts a narative style he can hold the reader spellbound. A paragraph which begins, "When Reinhard Hardegen (U123) surfaced off the East coast of the United States for the first time, he couldn't believe his eyes." It's hard to set a book down with that sort of lead in. Likewise Gunter Prien's (U47) words to First Watch Officer Engelbert Endrass explaining the misson to penetrate Scapa Flow speak volumes about the dangers of the attempt: "Hold onto to something, Endrass," Prien said, "We're going into Scapa Flow."

Nowhere have the North Atlantic winter storms and their effect on the boats and crews been better described. In one instance the entire bridge lookout crew of a boat was swept away by heavy seas, and their loss not discovered until the next watch came through the hatch to find it the bridge empty except for some shredded safety belts. The boat had been running blind for hours.

 Blair is at his best when he brings events down to the human level: Donitz' frustration at having his Atlantic attack boats sent off on pointless far-flung missions by Hitler, The almost overnight change for the Battle of the Atlantic brought about with the dual introduction by the allies of the Leigh Light and Centemetric radar in hunter-killer aircraft. The loss of Gunter Prien and U-47. (Sadly preceeded by ten pages of statistics and graphs which could have been relegated to footnotes.)

In summary, Hitler's U-Boat War is a mixed bag. A tendency toward dry facts, dates and stats rob some of the drama from the Atlantic conflict. Still there is enough here to merit the attention of any serious student of naval history. For those with only a passing interest there are shorter and less costly alternatives. Put another way, I read the 1400+ pages and am glad I did so. Would I read it a second time? Probably not.  Those who want to sample the book(s) are best directed to their local library before purchase.

[dougie47]

Hi Don,

Thanks for the review. I agree exactly with your summary. I find them very useful for the sheer amount of information they hold.  But this wealth of information and stats can often detract from story-telling, and indeed the reader's enjoyment of the book.

You are entirely correct to point out his contention that the U-boat danger was overstated. I do think he had an "axe to grind" on this issue! During the early wars Allied personnel perceived the U-bootwaffe to be a grave threat. While this threat did not materialise to the extent that had been feared, people were still correct during the early years to fear the U-boats. A merchant sailor who sailed in 1941 would likely not have been able to foresee Black May.

Only by the application of a great deal of resources - equipment, manpower and scientific development - was the U-boat threat neutralised. Without such dedicated application the story could have been quite different. Given that Clay Blair clearly thought the threat was overstated, do you think he would contend that some of these resources should have been used in other ways against Germany?

Happy New Year,

Dougie

[Greif]

Hi Don, excellent review.  I also have both volumes, and Blair's book on the sub war in the Pacific "Silent Victory" as well.  I agree that soemtimes interesting stories get buried under a mountain of facts in the books.  They are an informative read which will give the reader a pretty indepth understanding of the development of the Battle of the Atlantic; if the reader can slog his way through the material.  They are "heavy" reads for sure.  "Silent Victory" has some of the same problems; and strengths.  And reading all three books gives one a very nice persepective of submarine doctrine, tactics, technology and, to a certain extent, the men who manned them.  The development of ASW assets is also well laid out. 

Again, nice capsule review!

Ernest

[Don in Cincinnati]

Hi Don,

Thanks for the review. I agree exactly with your summary. I find them very useful for the sheer amount of information they hold.  But this wealth of information and stats can often detract from story-telling, and indeed the reader's enjoyment of the book.

You are entirely correct to point out his contention that the U-boat danger was overstated. I do think he had an "axe to grind" on this issue! During the early wars Allied personnel perceived the U-bootwaffe to be a grave threat. While this threat did not materialise to the extent that had been feared, people were still correct during the early years to fear the U-boats. A merchant sailor who sailed in 1941 would likely not have been able to foresee Black May.

Only by the application of a great deal of resources - equipment, manpower and scientific development - was the U-boat threat neutralised. Without such dedicated application the story could have been quite different. Given that Clay Blair clearly thought the threat was overstated, do you think he would contend that some of these resources should have been used in other ways against Germany?

Happy New Year,

Dougie

Any answer I might give about your question would be pure speculation on my part, but my first reaction is that Blair feels that from the wealth of new information now available, (Some only recently declassified) we might have allocated resources more effectively  back then had we been privy to this information at the time.

He does make a good case for a lot more allied bombing attacks on sub pen sites on the west coast of France before the sites were hardened and were virtually impenetrable from that point on. Also for more firepower directed at the U-boat construction sites. In essense, I think he seems to feel that more preemptive strikes would have been to the allies advantage since this would have prevented more subs from getting to combat zones in such numbers.

Despite his "mountain of facts" I agree largely with you that he overstates his case. That said, I do think the anti-German forces were lax in going to convoying sooner, and that sharing the scientific data between England and the U.S. left something to be desired. The same could be said of inter-servive rivalries between Army, Navy and Air Force on our side.

One further drawback from the German point of view is that the Military in general, and the Kreigsmarine in particular felt that they were nowhere near ready to fight a world war. Given that, they put up one heck of a fight.

Happy New year, Dougie.

Don

[Rokket]

Very nice review Don, and an interesting thread this!

I saw a book recently on how the Great Depression was "sort of a lie". The author's point was that those that lived through it (my parents) had heaps of fun and were very positive about it. I see that as being similar to this "overstated U-boat threat."

I think the Depression author misses the point. Yes, they rolled up their sleeves and made the best of it, but life sucked! I think Blair may be in the  - pun coming, wait for it...same boat! (HA!) Dougie states it very well above 9and like many things, the solution is/was multiple, no magic bullet). I still think King had his own Pacific agenda, and as mentioned, merchantmen weren't too crazy about uboats with good reasons, they died a lot!

In the Blair vein, I throw this out there too for fun: ALLIED goal in WW2: stop an evil madman and empire from taking over Europe. Successful with Russian help, an then ...Russians control half of Europe for 50 years, crushing all (poor Poland!). So one could make a case that the Allies were only half successful, Stalin and the Russians were just different and slightly less impact, so what was the point? (just tossing it out there to cause trouble, er, conversation!)

[Don in Cincinnati]

Very nice review Don, and an interesting thread this!

I saw a book recently on how the Great Depression was "sort of a lie". The author's point was that those that lived through it (my parents) had heaps of fun and were very positive about it. I see that as being similar to this "overstated U-boat threat."

I think the Depression author misses the point. Yes, they rolled up their sleeves and made the best of it, but life sucked! I think Blair may be in the  - pun coming, wait for it...same boat! (HA!) Dougie states it very well above 9and like many things, the solution is/was multiple, no magic bullet). I still think King had his own Pacific agenda, and as mentioned, merchantmen weren't too crazy about uboats with good reasons, they died a lot!

In the Blair vein, I throw this out there too for fun: ALLIED goal in WW2: stop an evil madman and empire from taking over Europe. Successful with Russian help, an then ...Russians control half of Europe for 50 years, crushing all (poor Poland!). So one could make a case that the Allies were only half successful, Stalin and the Russians were just different and slightly less impact, so what was the point? (just tossing it out there to cause trouble, er, conversation!)

You make some good points, rokket. It is really not my intention to speak for Clay Blair who does quite well without me. Nor is it my intention to defend his thesis.
It is, however, my intention to spark some spirited debate (hopefully backed with facts rather than emotions.) among those of us who are U-boat afficionados, and who are as interested in the history of the conflict as the boats themselves.

First, his contention that the U-boat menace was "overstated:"

Blair does not suggest that it wasn't a remarkably effective weapon and was made worse by the propaganda aspects which struck fear into the hearts of those on the other side. (And which, according to Donitz memoirs, was always a major factor in his mind.) If I read Blair corectly what he is suggesting is that at that time, -and for some time after the war- accounts of the battle that did appear were incomplete, inaccurate, full of errors in fact and conclusions, and that while the threat to the free world was quite real, the impression that German U-boats came within a whisker of defeating the allies is a myth. He would argue that material released as late as the 1980's suggests otherwise. I'll leave it to those who disagree to read the books and make an argument for the opposing point of view.

As to the Russian friend or foe debate:

I agree that we (The allies) made a pact with the devil to address the most immediate threat to the free world i.e. Nazi domination of Europe and much of the free world. (And to thwart the holocaust as well.) More than one politician over the years has made the case for supporting an unpopular regime with the argument that yes, a dictator may be an SOB, but he's our SOB. The other side of the question. of course, is what would have happened had we not taken Russia as a partner? I don't pretend to know the answer.

I suppose, in the final analysis, a case could be made that we finally did win with the collapse of Soviet communism. (Win seems an inappropriate word here, doesn't it, considering the suffering in post war Eastern Europe?)

Wasn't it Napoleon who said history is an agreed upon myth?

At any rate a little historical debate is a nice little 'time out' while trying to debond that piece of photo-etch from a body part or find that tweaser launched tiny piece in the shag rug.

 

[Greif]

I am by no means an absolute expert on the Battle of the Atlantic, but I think it's story has alot in common with the Battle of Britain (which was the basis for my masters thesis in history some years ago).  Both battles, campaigns really, have been recounted so often, by some many different authorities, over the years that facts have become intertwined with myths. The principle myth of both, is that the Germans came very close to winning, though they came much closer in the uboat war.

I think Germany lost the Battle of the Atlantic for three broad reasons:
1) Insufficient operational uboats during the time period, 1939-1942, when they had an excellent chance to win.
2) Ultimately losing the technology race. (You touched on this when you mentioned the allied development of CM wave radar.)
3) Closely tied to the above, the Germans were slow to realize the effectiveness of allied HF-DF RDF, and when it was coupled with the breaking of the "Shark" key of the Engima it began the near slaughter of the uboats.  

1)  Don you are correct that the Uboat arm of the Kriegsmarine did not have a sufficient number of uboats at the start of WWII.  Doenitz stated in his memoirs that he wanted at least 100 more operational boats of the Type VII/IX variety.  He actually started with 57-58 operational uboats, depending on what sources one believes.  In 1940 Germany commissioned 55 uboats.  They lost 24 that year, therefore, roughly 80 uboats were operational at any time in 1940.  That year, uboats sank 471 ships (Blair claims 520) worth about 2,606,000 BRT.  Surface ships and the Luftwaffe sank a further 1,917,000 BRT.  The important number here is 60.  Why could German industry only produce 60 uboats for commissioning in 1940?  The reason, and it had a deliterious effect on the Heer and Luftwaffe also, was that German industry was not fully mobilized for war.  In fact it would not become fully mobilized until early 1943.  This lack of "full war effort" led to slow production values for armaments of all kinds.  This was an "own goal" for the Germans, as it could have been avoided by better management on their part.  It is interesting to speculate just how much more effective the uboat arm would have been with an additional 100 operational boats.  Making a very conservative estimate, if those 100 uboats had been on hand and each boat sank an average of three ships for 16,600 BRT, then one could add an additional 1,660,000 BRT sank in 1940.   Taken together the total BRT for 1940 would then have been 6,183,000; a war winning rate of sinkings.  I will address my reason 2 and 3 in another post.  Football is almost on!

Ernest

[Greif]

Ahh, on to reason #2 on my list.  Though Germany was more advanced then the allies in many areas of technology and research; the were clearly behind when it came to radar and radar countermeasures.  That's not to say there development of such system was completely ineffective, it wasn't.  However, they were always a step behind the allies on the developmental track.  Don, your example of the allies development of cm wave radar is a perfect example of how allied R&D in the radar field gave them a decided advantage over the Germans.  Germany never really cracked the code on the development of cm wave radar.  This led to reduced effectiveness in both the use of radar and the development of radar countermeasures.  The allied advantage in this area became decisive in mid-1943; and from there it was a rapid downward spirial for the uboots.  As an aside, the german inability to develop cm wave radar also hampered their nightfighters to an extent.  Because the equipment needed to operate mm wave radar was larger and heavier then that needed for cm wave, the performance of German nightfighters took a hit.  Though they proved to be an effective weapon as they were, they would have been much much more effective with cm radar.  The technological battle of measures/countermeasures was very much the same in both the Battle of the Atlantic and the battle between the German nighttime air defense organization and RAF's Bomber Command; though the Germans were able to keep pace in the latter.

So why were the Germans behind here?  Two reasons predominate I think.  First, allied scentists just happened to be better in this particulair area then the german ones.  (Sometimes you're the hammer and sometimes you're the anvil!) Second, like so much of the German R&D effort, the development of cm wave radar was negatively impacted by political interference and inter-service/departmental rivalries.  Dissipation of effort always leads to less then satisfactory results.

Ernest     

[Don in Cincinnati]

Ahh, on to reason #2 on my list.  Though Germany was more advanced then the allies in many areas of technology and research; the were clearly behind when it came to radar and radar countermeasures.  That's not to say there development of such system was completely ineffective, it wasn't.  However, they were always a step behind the allies on the developmental track.  Don, your example of the allies development of cm wave radar is a perfect example of how allied R&D in the radar field gave them a decided advantage over the Germans.  Germany never really cracked the code on the development of cm wave radar.  This led to reduced effectiveness in both the use of radar and the development of radar countermeasures.  The allied advantage in this area became decisive in mid-1943; and from there it was a rapid downward spirial for the uboots.  As an aside, the german inability to develop cm wave radar also hampered their nightfighters to an extent.  Because the equipment needed to operate mm wave radar was larger and heavier then that needed for cm wave, the performance of German nightfighters took a hit.  Though they proved to be an effective weapon as they were, they would have been much much more effective with cm radar.  The technological battle of measures/countermeasures was very much the same in both the Battle of the Atlantic and the battle between the German nighttime air defense organization and RAF's Bomber Command; though the Germans were able to keep pace in the latter.

So why were the Germans behind here?  Two reasons predominate I think.  First, allied scentists just happened to be better in this particulair area then the german ones.  (Sometimes you're the hammer and sometimes you're the anvil!) Second, like so much of the German R&D effort, the development of cm wave radar was negatively impacted by political interference and inter-service/departmental rivalries.  Dissipation of effort always leads to less then satisfactory results.

Ernest     

Nicely done, Ernest.

I find it amazing that the allies made such advances in radar technology despite the fact that it took both FDR and Churchill's personal intervention to get the scientists on our respective sides to share their secrets with each other. Same with Enigma and code breaking techniques. Oddly it was German scientists who were constantly reassuring a suspicious Doenitz that the enigma code was unbreakable just as they assured Hitler that cm radar was not possible.

And lets not overlook the fact that a lot of the German scientists either left the Reich on their own as Hitler came to power or, in the case of jewish scientists, were forced to leave (Does the name Albert Einstein ring a bell?) or later sent off to the camps. In addition to that, the matter of allocation of meager resources came into play. It must have been frustrating to the German scientific community to watch a much needed semi-precious metal go to building shells when it might have helped solve problems on the technology front.

I wish I could remember who said it, but someone in the American post war scientific community was asked how we managed to beat the Russians to the moon. His reply: "Our German scientists were better than their German scientists."

Considering that they had a cartoon cast running the country at that time they managed to do a remarkable job all the same. I remember a friend's father, an old WWII flier, who told us that the first jet plane he ever saw was German and it was shooting at him

We have an interesting dialogue going here, don't we? Let's see if we can get anyone else to jump in.

Don

[Don in Cincinnati]

OBTW Ernest:

While I have not yet figured out how to post pictures here (I have figured out how to turn my computer on now  ) Dougie has thoughtfully posted pictures of my U-boat diorama. Just scroll down to "Kruppwerkes dio" below the book review commentary.

Don

[Greif]

Thanks Don.  You are right about alot of the German leadership at the top being somewhat of a circus act.  It is rather chilling to contemplate what might have occured if the Nazis had had a more enlighted view towards the jews and all those scentists had remained to work for the fatherland.  In regards to the enigma code, the Germans had a blind spot there, just as they did with their codes in WWI.  Sometimes people just don't learn I guess.  Your bring it up is nice sedgeway into my third reason for Germany's defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic.

You bring up a good point about it taking pressure from the very top to get American and British sources to share information.  And even then there was still a bit of a shell game played.  However once they did pool their resources it was decisive.  The Ultra story is an interesting one, in and of itself.  A little known fact about Ultra is that the allies were not able to consistently crack the code used by BdU because the "Shark" key used four rotors in the Engima Machine versus three used by the Heer and Luftwaffe.  Once that key was able to be consistently broken in mid-1943, coupled with the synergy of technological breakthroughs in radar, sonar, and weaponry and HF-DF at about the same time, the tide of battle turned quickly and decisively against the Germans; and they were never able to catch up.  After that, as Blair's title of his second volume well points out, the uboats became the hunted.

This is a neat conversation, and I am enjoying it very much.  This has nothing to do with the topic, but my area of expertise is actually the Luftwaffe; I am half German on my mother's side.  My maternal grandfather flew He 111's and JU 88's in WWII.  I picked up my interest in the luftwaffe from him. So this is am interesting change of pace for me.

Ernest 

     
Nicely done, Ernest.

I find it amazing that the allies made such advances in radar technology despite the fact that it took both FDR and Churchill's personal intervention to get the scientists on our respective sides to share their secrets with each other. Same with Enigma and code breaking techniques. Oddly it was German scientists who were constantly reassuring a suspicious Doenitz that the enigma code was unbreakable just as they assured Hitler that cm radar was not possible.

And lets not overlook the fact that a lot of the German scientists either left the Reich on their own as Hitler came to power or, in the case of jewish scientists, were forced to leave (Does the name Albert Einstein ring a bell?) or later sent off to the camps. In addition to that, the matter of allocation of meager resources came into play. It must have been frustrating to the German scientific community to watch a much needed semi-precious metal go to building shells when it might have helped solve problems on the technology front.

I wish I could remember who said it, but someone in the American post war scientific community was asked how we managed to beat the Russians to the moon. His reply: "Our German scientists were better than their German scientists."

Considering that they had a cartoon cast running the country at that time they managed to do a remarkable job all the same. I remember a friend's father, an old WWII flier, who told us that the first jet plane he ever saw was German and it was shooting at him

We have an interesting dialogue going here, don't we? Let's see if we can get anyone else to jump in.

Don
 
 
 

[Greif]

Don, I just finished looking at your Krupp Works diorama.  WOW!  Is my first reaction.  You did a beautiful job that rightly won first place.  Between that tour de force and Siara's U552 I am almost ashamed to display my builds.  Well done and my hat is off to you!

Ernest

[Don in Cincinnati]

Don, I just finished looking at your Krupp Works diorama.  WOW!  Is my first reaction.  You did a beautiful job that rightly won first place.  Between that tour de force and Siara's U552 I am almost ashamed to display my builds.  Well done and my hat is off to you!

Ernest

Thanks for the kind words, Ernest. No need for reticence on your part. Your work is the equal of just about any I've seen here. (or at contests, for that matter.)

To be perfectly honest the diorama was more the result of determination, research, vision and basic modeling skills than anything else. In large measure it involved little more than three years of cutting, sawing, gluing, patching, sanding, aligning, painting and weathering which are nothing more than it takes to build a simple model except over a longer period of time. (It also helps to be a little crazy, into the bargain.)

The two things I found most difficult were the lack of A to Z building instructions (which is always a problem in any scratchbuild) and called for working building sequences out in my head and on paper before each step. Then too, there is always the boredom of repetitive tasks.

Your kind words mean a lot and are appreciated.

Don

[Don in Cincinnati]

Don:
This is a neat conversation, and I am enjoying it very much.  This has nothing to do with the topic, but my area of expertise is actually the Luftwaffe; I am half German on my mother's side.  My maternal grandfather flew He 111's and JU 88's in WWII.  I picked up my interest in the luftwaffe from him. So this is am interesting change of pace for me.

Ernest: 
I found your comment very interesting as the first model I ever built -except for the Balsa and paper ones of my misspent youth- was the Monogram He 111 about 15 years ago. I botched it up pretty badly as a first attempt, but later I built one that still graces my shelf.

I always considered that airplane to be one of the most graceful birds ever built, although I've read that all that perspex up front was sometimes a nightmare to the pilots when flying in strong sunlight. (Second favorite on my list was the Arado AR 234)

If Dougie and Rokket don't object too much to a small dialogue on aircraft (Hey guys, I AM letting the glue dry on the newly installed scratchbuilt pressure hull on U96.) Let me recommend a book to you. It is titled Wings of the Luftwaffe by Captain Eric Brown who was chief test pilot for the RAF at Farnborough. The book is all about his impressions flying German aircraft directly after the war. Along with his comments are beautiful cut-away drawings of the planes and excellent detailed cockpit drawings as well. The publisher is Airlife and the ISBN # is 1-85310-413-2.

Just to cover ourselves, maybe you should say something in U-Boat talk when you reply!

All the best,

Don

[Greif]

Hi Don,

Thank you for the kind compliment about my modelling ability.  The book by Cpt. Brown is a great resource.  His comments have some pretty interesting insights and the pictures are excellent reference resources.  Two other great sources of reference is LuftVerlag's "Luftwaffe im Focus" series and Kagero's Monograph series.  If you have not checked them out before they are well worth you time.  LuftVerlag also has 5 volumes of "U-Boot Im Focus" magazine.  I have used them quite a bit, the pictures themselves are worth the price.

Hmm, another uboot comment...I have finished the engine room and have posted my build plan for the galley/P.O. quarters in the Type VII thread. 

Good talking with you,
Ernest   

[dougie47]

Hi gents,

Very interesting thread, gentlemen. No problem whatsoever if the thread moves to other subjects. I'm as interested in aircraft as I am in U-boats - so you'll have plenty of encouragement from me if you want to talk Luftwaffe! 

Ernest, one of your points touched on a subject that I've wanted to explore further. However, I don't have the resources or the knowledge to explore it properly. In recent years I've often pondered two questions -

1 - How many ocean going U-boats (VIIs and IXs) would the U-bootwaffe have required in 1939/1940 to actually win the war (or at least force a ceasefire by British forces)? Let us call this number X.

2 - Could Germany have built X number of boats by 1939/1940 AND enough tanks and aircraft to win their European battles?

Cheers,

Dougie

[Greif]

Hi Dougie, based upon the average tonnage sunk per uboot in 1939/1940 I think if Germany had had another 90-100 Type VII/IX uboots they had a good chance of forcing a truce on Great Britain.  In my second post on the topic I gave an estimated figure of slightly over 6,180,000 BRT sunk to Ubootwaffe, the Luftwaffe and surface forces if Germany had fielded an additional 100 uboots.  I gave the lower end of the estimated range by the way, which is between 6,000,000 and 7,250,000 BRT.  Great Britain would have been unable to sustain itself suffering such losses to its merchant marine fleet.  Their shipbuilding program would not have been able to replace the losses fast enough to even partially offset them.  As I am sure you know, in the actual battle the Brits were unable to keep up with the rate of sinkings and turned to America.  That led to the Emergency Shipbuilding Program being ordered by FDR in January 1941, which allowed the allies to keep pace at first then outstrip losses.  In addition to the at least 6,000,000 BRT being sunk in 1940,  1941 would also have been a black year.  In closing, I think with those additional 90-100 uboots Germany would have won the "Tonnage War" by mid-41 at the latest. 
To answer your second question, I think had Germany mobilized its industry to a 100% war footing at the beginning of the war they could have just met the requirements.  I base my thesis here on the fact that once Albert Speer took control of the war production, the productivity of the German's heavy industry exploded.  And this at a time when the strategic bombing campaign was forcing the Germans to decentralize production, which negatively impact industrial output.  What would that output have been if Speer, with the full backing of Hitler, had been given that level control in say August 1939, long before heavy bomber fleets ranged widely across German airspace?  The answer is rather chilling.

 I admit the above is pretty short, but internet forums don't lend themselves well to dessertations!

Ernest

Hi gents,

Very interesting thread, gentlemen. No problem whatsoever if the thread moves to other subjects. I'm as interested in aircraft as I am in U-boats - so you'll have plenty of encouragement from me if you want to talk Luftwaffe! 

Ernest, one of your points touched on a subject that I've wanted to explore further. However, I don't have the resources or the knowledge to explore it properly. In recent years I've often pondered two questions -

1 - How many ocean going U-boats (VIIs and IXs) would the U-bootwaffe have required in 1939/1940 to actually win the war (or at least force a ceasefire by British forces)? Let us call this number X.

2 - Could Germany have built X number of boats by 1939/1940 AND enough tanks and aircraft to win their European battles?

Cheers,

Dougie

[dougie47]

Hi Ernest,

Thanks for taking the time to answer my two questions. VERY interesting! Given the high number of U-boats that Germany actually did build during WWII, another 100 by the turn of 39/40 does not seem a large number.

Another aspect that could have increased sinkings is the torpedo failure rate. If Germany had produced reliable torpedoes by the start of the war, then...well let us just be thankful they did not. For example, U 47 fired 87 torpedoes during patrols 1 to 9. 56 torpedoes were "fehlschu

[Rokket]

Interesting! I agree with Dougie about the number. I mean really, that's relatively nothing. But again, the Luftwaffe was pretty well equipped weren't they, wouldn't a little smart management and support have rolled them on to victory (or closer)?

Wouldn't it be interesting to have forgotten the war, and brought the German, Russian, Brit, and US scientists together to advance aviation and nuclear power and such (as in, conquer fission to learn about stuff, and move on to fusion)? I mean, Germany and rockets and jets, pretty cool stuff! More resources and they could have really gone far. But they weren't so hot in the radar dept as mentioned, and Engima, despite it's toughness, was failed enough to hurt! (And the Japanese code got broken 'easily"). But we could have jetpacks and fyling cars by now! (I think Where eagles Dare - fun but flawed- uses a prototype helicopter in once scene...)

Oh well, mixed and alternate history speculation. (Bearing in mind this is soo easy for me in my armchair with my comic book education!)

[Greif]

Hi Dougie and Wink, let me build on my thesis a bit.  At the beginning of the war Germany had 57 operational uboats of the following types:  2 Type Ia, 30 Type II's, 18 Type VII's and 7 Type IX's.  Of the most effective types of uboats, only 25 were operational, and though the Type I's and II's gave a good account of themselves they were secondary players in the Tonnage War.  During 1939 Germany commissioned a further 18 uboats, 7 after the war started.  Of the number of commissioned uboats in 1939 5 were Type II's and one was the UA.  Interestingly, Germany only commissioned 4 Type VII's between 1 Sep - 31 Dec 1939!  During the same time period they lost 9 uboats.  Taking new construction vs losses Germany had an average of about 50 operational uboats daily during 1939, 60% of those being the marginal Type II's.

Moving to 1940.  Germany began the year with 55 operational uboats, two less then they started the war with.  During the year they commissioned 55 uboats, 17 being Type II's; therefore they commissioned only 38 uboats of their most effective uboats during all of 1940.  24 uboats were lost during 1940.  Using the same logic of adding commissionings minus sinkings we arrive at the average of around 80 operational uboats during the year.  Figuring the precentage of Type II's is tough as the A&B's were withdraw from frontline duty starting in May, the C's did remain as operational uboats throughout most of the years and a few of the D's also served as frontline uboats.  I good estimate would be 25-30% of the operational uboats in 1940 were Type II's.

I will use Blair's own figures for the total sinkings by the above uboats as statistics vary widely.  Blair states uboats sank 147 ships in 1939 and 520 ships in 1940.  A total of 667 ships for about 3,690,000 BRT.  Given the amount of operational uboats that averages out to about 5 ships sunk for 27,500 BRT per uboat.  Now add 100 uboats of the Type VII/IX variety in say an 80/20 mix -available on 01 September 1939.  As those uboats were larger and more effective then the Type II's which, as I showed above, made up a significant portion on the Ubootwaffe during that time period, it is not unreasonable to add an additional 550 sinkings for 3,025,000 BRT.  Sinkings on that scale would have been decisive.

Really enjoying this,
Ernest          

[dougie47]

Hi Ernest,

You are making a very plausible argument here. Perhaps an extra 100 VIIs/IXs would have sunk more than an extra 3,025,000 BRT?

I suppose in any counterfactual debate one should explore what the opposite side would have done in response. Let us suppose that Germany had built an additional 100 VIIs/IXs by 3 September 1939. This would certainly have alarmed Britain's Merchant Navy and Royal Navy. What would/could they have done in response? Perhaps they would have speeded up the Flower class corvette programme?

Another question, if you will permit me. How many additional U-boats do you think Germany would have built if they had built U-boats rather than the Bismarck? I know any answer would only be a rough estimate, and open to debate.

Don, hope you don't mind this thread straying in a counterfactual direction. I find counterfactual debates can improve our understanding of the real situation.

Cheers,

Dougie

[Don in Cincinnati]

Hi Ernest,

Another question, if you will permit me. How many additional U-boats do you think Germany would have built if they had built U-boats rather than the Bismarck? I know any answer would only be a rough estimate, and open to debate.

Don, hope you don't mind this thread straying in a counterfactual direction. I find counterfactual debates can improve our understanding of the real situation.

Cheers,

Dougie

Dougie:

No problem on this end. I had hoped the thread would spark some spirited comment and debate, and had made up my mind before posting the topic that it could take whatever course the participants wanted.

Regarding your Bismark comment, let me add another thought: How many 88's could Germany have produced by foregoing the big siege guns like the Gustav and Dora, not to mention the outsized armour like the Maus and King Tiger tanks?

Don

[Don in Cincinnati]

Coming back on topic, to Blair's books, I seem to recall one author suggested that the XXIs would not have been as effective as was feared. One of the considerations, if my memory serves me correctly, were the difficulties caused by their method of construction. Did Blair say something along those lines, Don? 

Cheers,

Dougie

This fact was mentioned in his books, Dougie, (as well as the sluggish diving characteristics of the Type IX boats compared to the superior performance of the VIII's.) and, as many critics point out he criticizes the "over engineered" quality of many Germsn military devices. Blair tries to be fair and, in his defense, strives for a middle tone. He does credit the IX's with extended range diue to larger fuek bunkers, but then goes on to talk about improvements along those lines to the Type VII's. He clearly has a warm place in his heart for the VII boat.

BTW: did you see the Top Ten Submarines show on whatever your version of the Military Channel is? The experts rated what they considered to be the best subs of all times based on firepower, range, and a whole variety of other criteria. The overall winner? The Type VIIc U-boat which aced out even the Nuclear subs.

Don

[Greif]

Hi Dougie, you are correct that an additional 100 Type VII/IX would have greatly alarmed the British, they would have remembered what the Ubootwaffe did in WWI.  Those 100 uboats would have to have been built in the late 1930's and the British would have undoubtly responded somehow.  However, given the mood of the non-German western powers, I don't think a massive ASW construction program could have begun any sooner than 1938 at the soonest.  By then it would have been too late as the Germans would have stolen a march, and I don't think the British could have caught up.  

I think about the second and third order effects of your second question from time to time.  And I'll extend you line of logic a bit further and say that if Germany had foregone the Bismarck class, the Scharnhorst class and the pocket battleships they could have produced close to the 100 uboats we are talking about.  The Germans got very little military return from any of the above ship classes, considering the resources they invested in building them.

I'll continue a bit later with this line of reasoning, and take on Don's point - which I agree with, family is here.

Ernest      

[Rokket]

Damn family!

OK, now following the no big BBs, what about building more S-boats? I really don't know much about them, but I have this hypothesis (not enough to be a theory) that hundreds of these guys could have been as effective as uboats...just lay in wait near the coast, wham-wham and gone, goodbye precious cargo. ut again, my comic-book education may make this silly.

back to the 00 more boats..would the Yanks have taken it more seriously too? And if so, focused more on the Atlantic, so much more that the Pacif was neglected? I know we should stay focused a bit, and take one thing at a time, but some of these are so inter-related...

[Greif]

Hi Wink, I don't think the S-boats had the range or seaworthiness to operate in the western approaches where the great bulk of the merchant shipping was.  They could have, and in some cases did, operate effectively against coastal convoys on the eastern coast of Britain.  But like the uboats there effectiveness took a big hit once the allies pulled firmly ahead in the technology race.  As to your second question, I think the USA would have diverted some resources to the Atlantic; but it would not have had a hugh impact on Pacific operations.  The ships needed for ASW work, DD's, DE's and such would have been missed in the Pacific, but; especially after late 1943, American shibuilding capacity was such that they could have made up the shortages.

Don - I couldn't agree more with your comments regarding the waste of resources that the super-heavy siege guns, Maus and King Tigers were.  It is the land version of lack of focus in both R&D and unity of effort overall that Doentiz faced trying to expand the Ubootwaffe.  Stupid on the German's part.

Ernest

[NZSnowman]

Greif & Don, I know very little about German Armour but when you guys talked about the 'Maus' are you talking about the Panzer VIII Maus German super-heavy tank design

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panzer_VIII_Maus

[Greif]

Hi Simon, that is the one!

Ernest

Greif & Don, I know very little about German Armour but when you guys talked about the 'Maus' are you talking about the Panzer VIII Maus German super-heavy tank design

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panzer_VIII_Maus

[Don in Cincinnati]

Hi Wink, I don't think the S-boats had the renge or seaworthiness to operate in the western approaches where the great bulk of the merchant shipping was.  They could have, and in some cases did, operate effectively against coastal convoys on the eastern coast of Britain. 
Ernest

From what little I know I'm inclined to agree about the S Boats, Ernest. While doing research for an American PT Boat model I was about to build, (Which I assume was analgous to the S boat) I learned that these boats, while somewhat effective, had many myths surrounding them which proved to be false or, at best, inaccurate.
Until that point I thought that their speed and handling made them largely invulnerable and highly deadly against surface ships. As it turned out, an enemy destroyer could close on an escaping PT boat over a distance of ground and had guns with far greater range so as to stand off and shell the smaller boat. Added to that a PT boat running at full speed for any length of time burned off so much fuel that it's range was severely limited.

S boats and PT boats are among some of the coolest marine vessels ever designed, but they had their limitations.

We sure have covered a lot of ground on this thread, haven't we? From a submarine book review to Luftwaffe aircraft, to S boats (And PT boats) in a few pages. Keep the good thoughts, speculations and conversation going, my friends. It's good fun at this end.

Don

[42rocker]

Wow - What a Great old thread. I wish that you folks would do a few more books and have threads like this on them.   
Thanks Again. 
 
Later Tim